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Abstract: In this paper, we demonstrate the trends and prospects of Japanese foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in European Emerging Markets (EEMs) against the background of the recent 
development of emerging markets and explore the specificities of the Russian market, the biggest 
EEM in terms of market size and inward FDI received. More specifically, we give an overview of 
foreign capital flows from Japan to major EEMs and describe the achievements and problems of 
Japanese investors as related to business with Russia. We find that the Russian market seems to be a 
lucrative option for Japanese firms, despite unfavorable investment conditions and limited 
institutional freedom afforded to outsiders, including a language barrier due to the wide usage of 
Russian in the business field. Although use of the Russian language is one of major business 
obstacles affecting foreign investors, making matters more challenging in the country, it nonetheless 
provides us with a common language as a hub of business operations in the former Soviet Union 
countries or “Russosphere,” where Russia has still economic leverage and maintains cultural 
domination. 
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1. Introduction 
Japan’s current account balance was radically changed in 2011, when it was forced to increase 
imports of fossil fuels because of an outage of all atomic power stations after the March 2011 
Fukushima nuclear disaster. The goods trade balance fell to a deficit for the first time in 30 years, 
and the trade deficit was sustained until the mid-2010s. However, the Japanese economy was able 
to keep its current account surplus during this period, and it expanded in the first half of 2017 to its 
highest level since 2007, as earnings from foreign investments moved further into the black and 
offset a rise in energy prices that made imports more expensive (The Japan Times News, August 8, 
2017).1 Although the size of Japan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) outflow and its overseas 
balance lags far behind other developed economies in terms of the ratio to the market size (GDP), 
the return rate of Japanese FDI has been increasing steadily since the beginning of the 1990s and is 
no lower than that of German FDI; therefore, the contribution of direct investment income received 
overseas to Japan’s balance of payments (current balance, income balance, and capital balance) has 
also risen during this period (Kumon 2013). In this process of change from a trading power to a 
major investment nation, the rapid growth of emerging market economies has an essential role to 
play in enhancing foreign investment activities (Tokunaga 2012a). Thus far, the European emerging 
markets (EEMs) have been one of the last newcomers for Japanese investors who accelerated 
overseas expansion after the full liberalization of inward and outward FDI in 1980 with a revision 
of the foreign exchange law. 
 In this paper, we demonstrate the trends and prospects of Japanese FDI in EEMs against 
the backdrop of the recent development of emerging markets and explore the specificities of the 
Russian market, the biggest EEM in terms of market size and inward FDI received. The remainder 
of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 offers an overview of foreign capital flow from 
Japan to major EEMs and reveals that investing in EEMs is less profitable for Japanese investors 
than it is in other Asian and Latin American emerging markets, with the exception of Russia, which 
seems to be a lucrative option for them, despite the unfavorable investment conditions and limited 
institutional freedom afforded to outsiders. Section 3 describes the achievements and problems for 
Japanese firms associated with Russian business by analyzing both enterprise-level statistics and 
questionnaire surveys and semi-structured interview data collected from Japanese companies 
developing business in Russia. Section 4 gives attention to the relationship between business and 
language and explores how the Russian language is one of the major business obstacles for foreign 
investors, making matters more challenging in Russia, yet providing us with a common language as 
a hub of business operations in former Soviet Union (FSU) countries where Russia still has 
economic leverage and maintains cultural domination, more or less. The last section summarizes 
our major findings and concludes the paper. 
                                                        
1 See Nakamura (2017) for the recent trends of Japan’s current account balance. 
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2. Specific features of the Russian market for Japanese investors 
2.1. Japanese foreign direct investment in European emerging markets 
The economic development of EEMs2 associated with transition to a market economy is closely 
linked to the advance of Western multinational companies (MNCs). Not only has foreign direct 
investment encouraged structural reforms among local firms of host countries, but it has also 
contributed to new market expansion for and enhancements in the cost-competitiveness of foreign 
MNCs through the allocation of business resources in pan-European networks. In addition to FDI, 
portfolios and other investments have helped EEMs achieve rapid economic growth by boosting the 
consumer market in the 2000s. The Central and Eastern European area of EEMs was institutionally 
incorporated into Western-dominated economic rules through the EU accession process. In this way, 
EEMs went through so-called Europeanization (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005), and 
Europe acquired its own emerging market territory within its border: European MNCs have an 
economic advantage over their U.S. and Japanese rivals in this regard. 
Although EEMs have received a great amount of foreign capital over the most recent two 
decades, Japanese firms are newcomers there. Despite a general awareness of large-scale 
production investments by a few big-name companies, Japanese FDI in EEMs had been 
comparatively slow, with an emphasis in the 1990s on the early establishment of sales subsidiaries 
(Inaba 2002; Marinov et al. 2003; Mizuho Research Institute 2006: 257–270).3 Only in the early 
2000s did Japanese entities expand trade and investment relationships with EEMs, sparked by 
Toyota’s decision to build up local production systems in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Russia.4 
Not only did Japanese FDI increase rapidly in the first half of the 2000s in anticipation of the EU 
accession of major EEM countries, but Eastern Europe also outperformed Western Europe as a 
destination of greenfield FDI from Japanese manufacturers (Ando 2006). When the global financial 
crisis of 2008–09 hit Japan harder than other major countries, Japanese firms sought to move their 
business operations and human resources overseas in order to exit a downturn in domestic demand. 
A survey by the Development Bank of Japan (2010), for example, showed that large manufacturers 
                                                        
2 In this paper, EEMs refer to 17 Central and Eastern European countries and four Commonwealth 
of Independent State (CIS) member states (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) located in the 
European part of the former Soviet Union. The Central and Eastern European countries consist of 
three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), four Central European countries (i.e., the 
Visegrád Four: Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia), and the other 10 Southeastern 
European countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania), unless otherwise noted. 
3 According to the classification of foreign subsidiaries by Benito et al. (2003), a sales subsidiary 
exemplifies a single-activity unit or a subsidiary with few value activities and a low level of 
competence. See also Eckert and Rossmeissl (2011) for an account of foreign subsidiaries in EEMs. 
4 Toyota opened two engine manufacturing plants in Poland in 2002 and 2005, a joint assembly 
plant with the French Groupe PSA in the Czech Republic in 2005, and a semi-knockdown assembly 
plant in Russia in 2007. These were all greenfield investments. 
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emphasized capital spending in foreign markets with the purpose of boosting their business 
operations and responding to stable demand from emerging market countries.5 Thus, whether the 
actors involved will expand and deepen the economic relationship between Japan and Europe—a 
relationship that has long been overshadowed by Japan–U.S. and Japan–Asia relations—will 
depend on Japanese firms’ performance in EEMs. 
In the late 1990s, Japan became the largest outward FDI investor in the world, overtaking 
European economic powers such as the U.K. and France. Roughly speaking, more than half of 
Japan’s total outward FDI was directed to North, Central, and South America; Europe and Asia 
each received less than 20% in the mid-1990s (Inaba 1999: 4–5). The Japanese economy, as the 
world’s second largest economic power after the U.S. economy and the largest capital supplier at 
that time, led us to study Japanese FDI dynamics, factors, impacts, and the like. In the context of 
Europe, including the former communist bloc countries, researchers have been concerned with the 
business contents and locations of Japanese MNC affiliates and have shown in great detail how 
they developed European business by using local resources and markets (e.g., Dicken et al. 1997; 
Morita 1998; Schlunze 2001, 2006; Inaba 2002; Marinov et al. 2003; Ikemoto 2007; Koyama and 
Tomiyama 2007; Imai 2011). Japanese business scholars have also explored ways in which their 
country has entered local markets and transferred Japanese production management to Europe 
(Kumon and Abo 2004; Tomiyama 2004, 2011; Wada and Abo 2005; En 2006). Furthermore, a few 
economists have developed an empirical model by employing a Japanese FDI dataset in Europe 
(Head and Mayer 2004; Yoshida et. al 2009; Morita 2011).6 Referring to these research results and 
some basic economic statistics, let us start with an overview of Japanese FDI activities in EEMs. 
A survey by Nikkei, Japan’s leading economic newspaper, has reported that the emerging 
market share of Japanese firms’ group-operating profits grew from 9% to 36% between 2000 and 
2010 (Nikkei, December 16, 2010). They boosted their emerging market businesses in the process 
of recovering from the global financial crisis; this was much more necessary for Japan than for 
Western competitors, given the background of the Japanese yen’s historical appreciation, which 
affected export profitability and increased the effectiveness of foreign investment (Nikkei, July 23, 
2011). Figure 1 reveals that the Japanese FDI balance has been increasing at close to the same pace 
as accumulated profits––a narrowly defined internal reserve, most of which would be appropriated 
to investment resources––of Japanese firms, meaning that they allocated accumulated capital 
surplus to overseas businesses after the late 1990s. With regard to the location of FDI balance by 
region, although its total doubled during the 2000s, its emerging market share increased from 26% 
                                                        
5 When interviewed by the Russian press, the president of Mitsubishi Motors said frankly, 
“Japanese businesspersons do not want to invest in Japan” (citation from the headline of the 
interview in Vedomosti, Russia’s business press, September 12, 2011). 
6 See also Head and Ries (2005) for a theoretical explanation of the large gap between Japan’s 
outward and inward FDI. 
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to more than 40% during this period. Asian and Latin American countries were the main targets, 
with other emerging markets such as Eastern Europe and Africa becoming foci of Japanese firms. 
Figures 2 and 3 indicate that the Japanese economy has deepened the country’s trade and 
investment relationship with EEMs; however, their share of total trade and FDI balance remained at 
2.9% (3.6% for exports and 2.3% for imports) and 0.65%, respectively—even when they reached 
the maximum value in 2008 for trade and in 2012 for investment.7 This relatively insignificant 
percentage is similarly reflected in the cross-border lending of Japanese financial institutions; the 
balance of cross-border lending on the basis of the final destination from Japan to the EEMs 
constituted no more than 1.1% of the total, even at its peak (see Figure 4). Therefore, all of these 
numbers derived from trade, investment, and financial statistics tell us that EEMs still remain a 
minor business space for Japanese MNCs. 
Note that these figures are likely to be underestimated because of the untraceability of 
goods and capital flows outside the home country, such as intra-firm trade among foreign 
subsidiaries and capital spending by regional headquarters. For instance, Asahi Glass, Japan’s 
leading glass producer, has invested in several float glass furnaces in Russia through its Belgian 
subsidiary Glaverbel (press release by Asahi Glass on March 22, 2007), and a major consumer 
electronics maker had long developed Russian business under the control of its Finnish subsidiary 
before establishing a Russian subsidiary in 2008 (from our interview with the Vice President of the 
company, Moscow, February 13, 2012). The Japanese bank sector widely uses their European 
branches located in Germany and the Netherlands to enlarge their financial operations in Russia 
(Gorshkov 2017). The Netherlands seems to be an investment hub in Europe for Japanese investors 
in general: a medical equipment supplier has been involved in their Russian business, which has 
been financed by the regional headquarters established in Amsterdam (from our interview with an 
executive director of this company, Kyoto, March 8, 2018). Quite interestingly, Japanese investors 
take a stake in one of the biggest investment opportunities in EEMs, Sakhalin oil and gas 
development project in the offshore fields northeast of Sakhalin Island in the Far East of Russia, 
less than 30 miles north of Hokkaido (the most northerly prefecture of Japan), likewise via the 
Netherlands (Endo 2007) with Sakhalin Energy Investment Company, an operator of the Sakhalin-2 
project, that was incorporated in a self-governing British overseas territory, Bermuda (Takahashi 
2010). This scheme does not seem to be limited to the Sakhalin Project; data from the Bank of 
Japan tells us that almost a quarter of Japan’s total FDI balance of the mining sector is found in 
Europe, the Netherlands (15.1%), and the U.K. (9.5%), among others, much of which is likely to go 
toward a resource-rich land such as the post-Soviet area (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan) and the 
Middle East region (United Arab Emirates etc.), where only a limited amount of the FDI balance of 
                                                        
7 These are our calculations, based on data from the Bank of Japan (various years) and Japan’s 
Ministry of Finance (2018a). 
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the mining sector is being recorded (just 0.4% of the total). Japan’s Ministry of Finance (2016) 
reported that the Netherlands is now the third largest recipient of Japanese FDI, trailing only the 
U.S. and China, where the mining sector accounts for more than 10% of the total direct investment 
balance. This is specific only to this country among the major lightly taxed countries.8 
According to local tax lawyers, the Netherlands has two main advantages for both 
domestic and foreign companies (from our interview with two Dutch tax lawyers, in Rotterdam and 
Amsterdam, on March 6 and 7, 2015). First, it has a pretty attractive tax scheme, often called “tax 
participation exemption.” The Dutch participation exemption has been one of the cornerstones of 
Dutch corporation tax law; it provides for an exemption for dividends and capital gains on 
qualifying participation (Janssen and Kiès 2015). This system enables Japanese investors to enjoy 
lower taxation on dividends to parent companies via the intermediary Dutch holding companies, as 
compared to direct distribution from oversea affiliates to parent companies in Japan (Hemels 2010). 
In a simplified description, whereas Russian affiliates are subject to a 15% tax on dividends to their 
headquarters in Japan, this tax rate could be reduced to 5% if they are financed via Dutch 
companies, thanks to privileges and immunities stipulated in the tax treaty between the Netherlands 
and Russia (Itoi 2018). Second, its bilateral tax treaty network with many European countries gives 
any business entities established in the Netherlands an opportunity to use this institutional asset, 
even if the home country does not negotiate a tax treaty with the host country. Take Japan and 
Russia—each has had a tax treaty with the Netherlands—as examples; they seem to operate with a 
de facto bilateral tax treaty in a contemporary style and reduce the risk of international double 
taxation. 9  Relying on this scheme, available from a worldwide tax treaty network, Dutch 
companies with affiliates in a third country (Russia, etc.) are able to distribute all dividends from 
Russia or any other country to Japan without any taxation, since this is set down in a bilateral tax 
treaty signed by the Japanese and Dutch governments in August 2010. 
 Moving back to the topic of FDI performance, Japanese manufacturers rushed into 
Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic from the end of the 1990s and reorganized their 
European production networks through the 2000s. As of the beginning of 2001, they considered 
these countries as the three most attractive investment destinations in all of Europe, thus revealing 
their expectations vis-à-vis the core region of EEMs becoming a “European factory” (Nikkei, 
                                                        
8 Although the Netherlands is not a tax haven in the usual sense, it is true that energy-sector FDI 
from the country sometimes corresponds to unknown investment activities by Dutch companies in 
Russia (Hanson 2010). 
9 The Japanese government signed a tax treaty with the Soviet Union in January 1986, and it went 
into effect in November of that year. It is easily understandable that this old scheme did not fit with 
the progress in marketization of modern business operations in Russia. Therefore, both countries 
agreed to conclude a new tax treaty based on the OECD Model Tax Convention and signed it in 
September 2017. It is expected to enter into force in 2019 after legislative ratifications in both 
countries (for more details, see Itoi 2018). 
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November 29, 2001). The local production of transportation equipment and electrical machinery, 
including ICT equipment, has expanded there, mainly in the form of greenfield FDI; the transfer of 
Japanese production systems––one of the main strengths of Japanese manufacturers in organizing 
superior product management––has succeeded thus far without serious troubles (En 2006).10 
Large-scale production investments by Toyota, Suzuki, Panasonic, and the like have accelerated 
Japanese FDI in EEMs.11 Through the end of 2010, Japanese manufacturers had established 1,108 
production facilities in all of Europe, including Turkey, of which 274 are located in Central and 
Eastern European countries and Turkey: by country, the Czech Republic and Poland were ranked 
fourth and fifth, above Italy and Spain (JETRO 2012: 2). In this way, some EEM countries steadily 
secured a foothold as a “European factory” by being incorporated into pan-European production 
networks. 
 
2.2. Is Russia Different? 
Many empirical works have indicated that EU accession proposals and the subsequent negotiation 
process have a positive influence on FDI for future member states by improving their investment 
environment (see Bevan and Estrin 2004; Clausing and Dorobantu 2005; Fabry and Zeghni 2006; 
Iwasaki and Suganuma 2009; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2010; Deichmann 2013; Derado 2013).12 A 
meta-analysis of the determinants of FDI in Central and Eastern and FSU countries has shown that 
institutional integration with Western Europe has a genuine FDI promotion effect for new EU 
member states (Tokunaga and Iwasaki 2017). This would be relevant for Japanese firms, as Morita 
(2011) infers a priori. However, Table 1 shows that Japanese firms’ FDI performance in EEMs is 
poor in terms of profitability, despite the fact that the return rate of direct investment in emerging 
markets is generally much higher than that in developed markets. What needs to be made clear is 
that improvements in the business environment do not always translate into a higher return on 
investment. The reasons for this are not difficult to see. 
First, the combined shares of the service, real estate, and finance and insurance sectors––
highly profitable industries compared to others––were no more than 10% of the total Japanese FDI 
balance in EEMs as of the end of 2010 (Bank of Japan 2011), thus, reflecting the competitive 
dominance of EU-based enterprises in these fields.13 Second, according to the Japan External 
                                                        
10 However, this has been identified as the cause of low profitability among Japanese MNCs. Refer 
to Urata (1998) and Itagaki (2002) for further discussion. 
11 See Marinov et al. (2003), Ikemoto (2007), and Koyama and Tomiyama (2007) for the 
investment profiles and management strategies of each company. 
12  Concurrently, Iwasaki and Suganuma (2009) found that EU member country candidates 
experienced an adverse impact on FDI in the final phase of the negotiation, given the substantial 
revision of conventional FDI incentives—which was most likely the price paid for becoming new 
EU members. An empirical study of regional FDI distribution in Poland supports the view that EU 
accession had a nonlinear effect on FDI decision making in the country (see Chidlow et al. 2009). 
13 In the 2000s, the main targets of world investors toward EEMs were financial sectors; they 
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Trade Organization (JETRO 2012: 27), 67.4% of the total sales of Japanese manufacturers located 
in Central and Eastern Europe were gained in Western Europe, where the FDI performance of 
Japanese firms has been lowest vis-à-vis the return rate of direct investment abroad in the advanced 
economies (see Table 1).14 This means that even if Japanese MNCs are deploying their own 
business resources in EEMs, they are, in fact, competing with Western rivals in mature European 
markets. In other words, EEMs are facing an economic dilemma wherein the more they strengthen 
their ties with Western Europe, the more significantly they lose the characteristics of emerging 
markets. 
 Concurrently, the same FDI statistics reveal two significant characteristics with respect to 
Japanese FDI in Russia, one of the largest EEM markets. First, from the mid-2000s onward, 
Japanese direct investment in Russia has accounted for 50–60% of the total direct investment in 
EEMs, with a few exceptions (see Figure 3).15 The country is now the largest EEM investment 
destination for Japan’s business society. Second, and more importantly, while Russia received a 
modest proportion of Japanese FDI as compared to other emerging markets, such as China, it 
witnessed a much higher investment return in the European market. As shown in Table 1, the 
annual return rate of direct investment in Russia was more than 13% for 1999–2007, when the 
country recorded remarkably rapid growth due to the rise in the price of oil; it had remained at 
almost 9%, or up to 7 times higher, against other EEMs through 2013, the year when Russia’s 
oil-price-hike-lead growth model faced falling oil prices and economic sanctions related to the 
Ukrainian crisis (Tabata 2016). A t-test for the average difference in the annual return rate of direct 
investment indicated that its average for Russia is statistically different from those for other EEM 
countries at the 10% level for both periods of 1999–2007 (t = 1.509, p = 0.083) and 1999–2013 (t = 
1.405, p = 0.090). This picture is endorsed by Russia’s higher labor productivity (sales per 
employee) as compared to that of five other EEM countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania) in the mid-2000s, as Figure 5 clearly demonstrates.16 These investment 
performance parameters are, as a rule, obviously linked by way of realizing business profits. 
 Direct investments by Japanese manufacturers in Russia are highly oriented toward the 
car industry and show a lack of business diversity: the business profiles of non-manufacturing 
                                                                                                                                                                  
accounted for approximately 40% of the total FDI balance in 2010 (wiiw 2011). More than 60% of 
banking assets in the new EU member states were held by foreign subsidiaries at that time 
(European Central Bank 2010: 20–21). 
14 Kumon (2013) also reports that Japanese firms’ profit rates are generally low in the EU market. 
15 Russia’s share exceeded 100% in 2013 because of the negative direct investment performance or 
withdrawal of oversea capital from other EEM countries. 
16 Figure 5 was compiled from an outward FDI database that was specifically established by the 
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), Japan to eliminate errors and biases 
associated with revision of the Survey on Overseas Business Activities of Japanese Enterprises 
released annually by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (see the next section for 
its outline). As for recent trends in Japanese FDI by region, see Masuda (2008) and Iwami (2009). 
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sectors that have advanced into Russia are also closely related to the car industry, such as car sales, 
car loans, and auto insurance. Although the number of Russian affiliates of Japanese firms directly 
related to the car industry remains at around 20% of the total,17 this industry has a broader business 
base and constitutes the majority of Japanese–Russian business. 18  This is reflected in the 
Japan-to-Russia export profile: motor vehicles (including car parts) constituted 77.2% of exports at 
its peak in 2008, in contrast to 2.5% in 1988.19 Japan’s exports of automobiles to Russia highly 
contributed to the boom in trade between the two countries in the 2000s, together with an eastward 
shift in the Russian economy as being reflected in its increasing exports of oil and gas to Japan 
(Tabata 2013). 
What must be noted here is that the majority of Japanese manufacturing factories in 
Russia are also associated with the automobile industry; only a few companies are operating lumber 
mills, food-processing plants, or heavy-equipment production factories. More importantly, the 
electric machinery industry—another big FDI player next to the automobile industry—has only 
built a limited number of assembly plants in Russia to date. In this respect, the country is quite 
different from other emerging-market economies such as China and the ASEAN countries 
(Tokunaga 2011; Nakai 2017). To quote a former director of the Russian subsidiary of the 
above-mentioned Japanese consumer electronics maker (see p. 5): “While the electric machinery 
industry, in general, needs a government policy of support for large business investments regardless 
of whether they are domestic or foreign––obviously the Russian government lacks such a strategy–
–the Russian market is far sweeter than any other for Japanese export-oriented industries” (from 
our interview with the director of the Moscow office of the Japan Center, April 1, 2010). Other 
managers of Russian affiliates of Japanese firms and consultancies agree that the Russian economy 
is much less competitive for developing local production networks and common production 
processes consolidated with neighboring countries than are the East Asian countries to which 
Japanese FDI rushed in the first stage of globalization. Figures 6 and 7 support this view: the labor 
productivity of Japanese manufacturers in Russia remained well below that in Western Europe, with 
a widening gap with other EEM countries in Eastern Europe; in contrast in non-manufacturing 
sectors, their labor productivity increased rapidly in Russia, outperforming their counterparts in 
other European markets.20 
 In brief, the FDI performance of Japanese MNCs suggests that the Russian market has 
thus far provided Japanese firms with a limited capacity for business activities, and yet it offers 
                                                        
17 This figure is calculated based on a dataset of overseas affiliates of Japanese companies 
provided by Toyo Keizai (2017). We will touch on this issue again in the next section. 
18 Refer to Tokunaga (2011; 2012b) for further discussion. 
19 These are our calculations from Japan’s trade statistics provided by Japan’s Ministry of Finance 
(2018). 
20 Using the original dataset of the Survey on Overseas Business Activities of Japanese Enterprises, 
we confirmed that this trend was continued until 2009. 
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quite lucrative business opportunities as compared to other EEMs. The economic attractiveness of 
Russia as an emerging market is supported by enterprise-level survey data. According to the results 
of an annual questionnaire survey on overseas business activities among Japanese manufacturing 
companies conducted by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), they earned much 
higher profits than expected, i.e., higher “unexpected” profits in Russia than in any other part of the 
world, putting Russia in first place in terms of profitability, at least prior to the global financial 
crisis (JBIC 2008: 25).21 Even during and after the crisis, Russia seemed not to have lost its 
attractiveness as a sales market for the European affiliates of Japanese firms: JETRO’s annual 
reports on Japanese affiliates in Europe demonstrate that the country ranked first or second from 
2007 through 2014 in terms of future sales destinations in Europe (JETRO 2017a: 32). 
 
3. Achievements and problems of Russian business for Japanese firms 
As we pointed out in the previous section, the inflow of foreign capital into Russia from foreign 
investors, including Japanese firms, has increased since the mid-2000s, and Russia currently enjoys 
the largest amount of foreign capital among EEMs. On the other hand, it was revealed that the 
Russian market has characteristics different from those of other EEMs, in that, for example, the 
return rate of Japanese FDI there is as high as that in Asian markets (see Table 1). In this section, 
after outlining the business expansion of Japanese firms into the Russian market, which has 
characteristics different from those of other EEMs, we will look at the problems that Japanese firms 
face and how they are dealing with those problems. 
First, we outline trends concerning Japanese firms’ entry into and withdrawal from Russia. 
According to the Annual Report of Statistics on Japanese Nationals Overseas, published by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, there are 450 of Japanese firms based in Russia as of October 
1, 2016; this figure is the 19th largest for individual countries where they operate. The breakdown 
is: 250 subsidiaries, 161 representative offices, 11 branches, and 28 unclassified bases (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017). It has been confirmed that more than half (55.6%) of these bases 
are subsidiaries. 
As described above, the expansion of firms into foreign countries can be roughly divided 
into three forms of bases: (1) subsidiaries, (2) branches, and (3) representative offices. As a matter 
of course, however, these three forms of bases vary widely, from a legislative point of view, in their 
activities and obligations,22 thus, the Japanese parent firms strategically choose the form of entry 
after considering this point. For example, because a representative office is not permitted to 
conduct commercial activities, Japanese firms must choose the form of a branch or a subsidiary if 
                                                        
21 Note that JBIC asked the surveyed enterprises to answer a question about their subjective 
evaluation of profitability in overseas markets––that is, to what extent profits earned were larger or 
smaller than planned––rather than their actual increase or decrease. 
22 The differences in conditions by form are detailed in Matsushima (2017) and JETRO (2015). 
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they plan to conduct commercial activities. However, because the activities of a branch office are 
more limited regarding imports and customs clearance than are those of a subsidiary, Japanese 
firms must choose the form of a subsidiary if they want to fully conduct their business activities. 
Related to this issue, some Japanese firms have changed their form of base from a representative 
office to a subsidiary in recent years, and other Japanese firms maintain both a representative office 
and a subsidiary (JETRO 2015; and from our interviews with the managers of Japanese subsidiaries 
in Russia). As described in an earlier section, Japanese firms’ headquarters can directly invest in 
their bases in Russia, invest through their regional headquarters in Europe, or jointly invest with 
their regional headquarters in Europe. It has been pointed out that Japanese firms often decide 
through which country they invest in their subsidiaries in Russia by taking into consideration the 
development division of each firm and the preferential treatment conditions of taxation between the 
registration country of the investing firm and Russia (Matsushima 2017). 
Among all sources that reveal trends of advancement overseas of Japanese MNCs, 
statistics from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seem to be the best for determining the number of 
foreign bases.23 However, these statistics only reveal the total number of bases, the breakdown of 
the forms of these bases, and the breakdown of all bases by industry and by diplomatic 
establishment (embassy, consulate general, etc.). From the data, it is impossible to know the 
breakdown of subsidiaries occupying a major part of the bases by industry, the withdrawal trend of 
Japanese firms from the Russian market, and so on. On the other hand, Japan’s Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry reports on the situation of overseas activities of Japanese firms in the 
Survey on Overseas Business Activities of Japanese Enterprises.24 This data has the advantage of 
making it possible to know the number of subsidiaries by country and the breakdown of 
subsidiaries by industry; however, it has the disadvantage of a low capture rate. Therefore, we 
outline the recent situation of Japanese subsidiaries in Russia, based on the Toyo Keizai’s data, 
from which it is possible to identify trends of entry and withdrawal of Japanese firms, although its 
capture rate is not as high as the data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The number of entries (establishment, operation, or investment of subsidiaries) of 
Japanese firms into Russia started to grow in 2003 and sharply increased in 2005 but dropped in 
2015 (see Figure 8). It has been pointed out that the accelerated entry of Japanese firms into Russia 
in 2005 was greatly influenced by the entry of Toyota in the manufacturing area (Nakai 2017; 
                                                        
23 As for the trends of Japanese firms expanding into Russia, the information possessed by the 
Japan Association for Trade with Russia & NIS (ROTOBO), a research institute specializing in 
Russia and New Independent States (NIS), has the highest capture rate; unfortunately, it is not 
accessible to the public. Using its own database, the Manager of the Research Department, Institute 
for Russian & NIS Economic Studies, ROTOBO, demonstrates the long-term trends of the 
establishment of Japanese subsidiaries in Russia (Nakai 2017). 
24 For details, see Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2017). 
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Umetsu 2017: 114; and from our interview survey in Russia).25 On the other hand, it can be said 
that the sharp decrease in the number of entries in 2015 was due significantly to the 2014 Ukrainian 
crisis and the depreciation of the Russian ruble. Meanwhile, between 2000 and 2016, an average of 
one company per year was withdrawn or merged. As a result, according to Toyo Keizai (2017), as 
of October 2016, 192 Japanese subsidiaries were operating in Russia (see Table 2). In view of the 
breakdown of these subsidiaries by industry, there are more non-manufacturing industries (146) 
than manufacturing industries (46), accounting for three-quarters of all Japanese subsidiaries. A 
more-detailed breakdown shows that the most subsidiaries by industry type are, in descending 
order: “wholesale of electric equipment” (21) and “manufacturing of transportation equipment,” 
“wholesale of machinery,” and “wholesale of transportation equipment” (18 for each). In this data, 
industry types are subdivided particularly finely for the service industry, and the total number of 
wholesalers is just 100, accounting for about half (52%) of all Japanese subsidiaries. It is possible 
to consider that these wholesalers function as sales companies for “machinery and transportation 
equipment,” which accounted for approximately 80% of Japanese exports to Russia in 2016, and 
for the 30 manufacturing sector entities (in machinery, electric equipment, and transportation 
equipment) in Russia. In addition, as we pointed out in the previous section, Japanese firms related 
to transportation equipment comprise about 20% of the total subsidiaries in the country.26 
Next, we will present the business environment in Russia, which can affect the business 
expansion of Japanese firms into Russia, and compare it internationally. According to Doing 
Business, a well-known international index on business environments by country published by the 
World Bank, the business environment in Russia has improved significantly. For example, Russia’s 
2010 rank in “ease of doing business” was 123rd of 183 countries, while it was 35th of 190 in 2017, 
improving within a short time span. Among the ten items in the overall determination criteria, 
Russia’s rankings in “starting a business,” “dealing with construction permits,” “getting electricity,” 
“getting credit,” “paying taxes,” and “trading across borders” climbed by 50 or more during the 
same time span, and those of the other items also improved; items for which Russia previously had 
                                                        
25 Toyota established a manufacturing plant in Saint Petersburg in 2005 and started production at 
the end of 2007 (from Toyota’s website: Establishment of TMMR, 
http://www.toyota.co.jp/jpn/company/history/75years/text/leaping_forward_as_a_global_corporatio
n/chapter4/section2/item3_c.html). 
26 The total number of companies in “manufacturing of transportation equipment,” “automobile 
sales,” and “wholesale of transportation equipment” is 38, accounting for 19.8% of all companies 
(see Table 2). Several other companies such as those in “manufacturing of rubber,” which focus on 
the production of car tires, can also be regarded as related to transportation equipment. The 
automobile industry is very extensive and influential, involving not only material manufacturers but 
also sales, service, and the finance industry. It is also known that Japanese automakers call for the 
entry of their affiliated car parts manufacturers when they expand their business operation overseas. 
Besides, some Japanese automakers have their own financial institutions engaged in car loans, etc., 
such as Toyota Bank (Gorshkov 2015). 
13 
 
a relatively high ranking remained at the same level (see Table 3). However, as also described later, 
corruption has been considered to be a serious problem in Russia and still remains unsolvable. In 
fact, Russia was ranked 154th of 178 countries in 2010 in the Corruption Perceptions Index, 
constructed by Transparency International, an international organization renowned for its 
anti-corruption campaign; it was 135th of 180 countries in 2017, which shows that it has not 
improved as much as Russia’s business environment rankings.27 
Thus far, we have reviewed international organizations’ assessments of Russia’s business 
environment. How, then, does the business environment in Russia look to Japanese firms operating 
in Russia? In addition, how do these Japanese firms respond to issues stemming from Russia’s 
particular business environment? We will examine this point based on various survey results from 
JETRO, a government-sponsored organization that works to promote mutual trade and investment 
between Japan and the rest of the world, the Japan Business Council for Trade and Investment 
Facilitation (JBCTIF), and our interviews with managers of Japanese subsidiaries in Russia. 
As described above, the number of Japanese firms entering into Russia dropped in 2015, 
while almost half (49.5%) of Japanese firms (excluding representative offices) already operating in 
Russia expected a surplus in operating profits in the same year (JETRO 2016). According to the 
same survey in 2017, the percentage of Japanese firms expecting a surplus increased to 66.3% 
(JETRO 2017b). It seems that business conditions are not so deteriorated by any means. However, 
Japanese firms have hardly expanded into Russia in recent years, which could be caused or affected 
by the business problems that Japanese firms actually face in Russia and the bad image of Russia 
that their parent firms have, in general. 
In 2017, Japanese firms ranked “market size/growth potential” as the biggest advantage 
of the investment environment in Russia, while the following problems rank high as risks: (1) 
volatility of exchange rates, (2) complex administrative procedures (permission and licenses, etc.), 
(3) complex tax system and procedures, (4) unstable political and social climates, and (5) 
inadequate and unclear legal system.28 Japanese firms consider the following more problematic, 
regarding the management challenges associated with the risks above: fluctuations in the exchange 
rate of local currency against the dollar/euro, complex procedures for customs clearance, and 
increases in the wages of employees. The percentage of respondents who chose those items above 
exceeded 50% because multiple answers were allowed (JETRO 2017b). What sorts of problems do 
the factors listed above cause? Regarding the exchange rate, it has been mentioned that auto parts 
that depend on imports are so affected by exchange rate fluctuations that profitability cannot be 
                                                        
27 Note that the corruption ranking denotes that the higher a country is ranked, the lower the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (or the smaller the number of corruption cases). 
28 As compared to results from the same survey in 2015, however, the percentage of respondents 
who chose these risk items declined. It can be said that these risks have become less influential in 
the past few years (JETRO 2016; 2017b). 
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ensured. Complex procedures not only mandate many required documents, but the responses often 
differ from contact to contact, giving rise to a need for confirmation in each case. It has also been 
pointed out that the time frames from receiving notice to the implementation of frequently changed 
laws and regulations are relatively short, and specific guidance is not provided to the contact person 
in charge; therefore, it is often the case that on-the-spot responses are impossible. In addition to 
many required documents and procedures, in principle, they are to be in Russian, which is 
time-consuming paperwork for foreign entities that increases operational costs (JBCTIF 2017). 
Russia’s economic institutions differ from those of Japan in many important ways, including their 
accounting systems and tax bases,29 so that more staff members (especially accounting experts) are 
needed than in other countries to respond to these differences. That leads to a sharp rise in labor 
costs (JBCTIF 2017; Matsushima 2017; and from our interview survey). Japanese firms often face 
other challenges associated with the Russian government’s policies. For example, the following 
policies are considered to be quite problematic: (1) import tariffs are higher than those in other 
countries and abruptly raised; (2) the competitiveness of foreign manufactures is lower than that of 
domestic entities, due to the recent introduction of the “recycling tax (vehicle disposal tax)”30; (3) 
the federal government’s policies, including the high import tariffs above, do not conform to WTO 
rules; (4) foreign companies operating in Russia are treated differently; (5) because personal data 
on Russians must be stored within the country, companies must set up data centers in Russia; and 
(6) it is difficult to protect intellectual property rights or patent rights (JBCTIF 2017).31 
In addition to the questionnaire surveys carried out by the Japanese side of the 
organization, a research team from the Russian side conducted a similar survey. According to the 
latter, Japanese firms’ major business challenges in Russia are: (1) language, (2) laws and 
regulations and procedures for clearing customs, and (3) taxes. In interviews by the researcher in 
                                                        
29 The tax systems, accounting systems, certification systems, labor systems, etc. in Russia are 
detailed in Matsushima (2017) and Umetsu (2017). Differences in the accounting systems of Japan 
and Russia can be found in Matsushima (2017). 
30 In Russia, a vehicle disposal tax on both new and used imported or domestically produced 
vehicles by weight and type (cars, buses, trucks, etc.) was introduced on September 1, 2012. At first, 
those meeting certain conditions, including being produced in Russia under the framework of 
“industrial assembly steps,” were exempted from the tax. However, when the law was revised as of 
January 1, 2014, domestic products that had been exempted from this tax scheme were subject to 
taxation under the same conditions as imports (from JETRO’s trade bulletin, October 24, 2013: 
https://www.jetro.go.jp/biznews/2013/10/5268825412110.html). In spite of the law’s revision, 
however, it has been pointed out that domestic manufacturers are virtually compensated in a form 
unrelated to the recycling tax; foreign manufacturers can also be exempted from the recycling tax, 
although the exemption criteria are, in effect, too strict to be met (JBCTIF 2017). It is often been 
said that this tax regime could force foreign automakers in a disadvantageous position (See, for 
example, Vedomosti, March 7, 2018).  
31 One of the authors (Suganuma) also frequently heard about these challenges in interviews with 
the managers of Japanese subsidiaries in Russia, which were conducted from 2015 to 2017. 
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charge of the Japanese firms in this survey, it was pointed out that labor resource management is a 
major challenge (Ershova 2017). The language issue is also described by Rebrei (2014: chapter 3; 
2015) and Gorshkov (2015). 
Although it is more or less true even for other emerging/developing countries, Russia’s 
economic systems and specific circumstances are different. These systemic divergences vary widely. 
For example, in terms of labor management, employment in Russia is, in principle, of unlimited 
duration, and employers are responsible for all social security costs. It is possible to consider that 
this is caused or affected in some way by their historical experience with socialism and systemic 
transformation, cultural differences, etc. Japanese firms in Russia are unavoidably forced to 
respond with flexibility to circumstances different from those they would encounter in their home 
country. Japanese firms in Russia often respond to the many complex document preparation 
requirements and procedures by relying on manpower. In some cases, they directly ask the 
authorities concerned or local governments to make improvements in their seemingly unreasonable 
system or the operation of the system. In addition to responding to these challenges, companies 
face the usual task of making a profit by developing markets and through other means. In doing so, 
negotiations in Russian are naturally required and important. Japanese firms in Russia seem to take 
the following four measures to smoothly launch these negotiations: (1) asking for Russian staff 
with English skills, (2) stationing Japanese staff who can speak Russian (Japanese expatriates 
and/or locally hired Japanese employees), (3) hiring Russian staff who can speak Japanese, and (4) 
utilizing local companies (see Table 4). For companies that require transactions with the Russian 
authorities, companies, and individuals, measure (2) or (3) seems to be used most often. Many 
other companies focus on measure (1). In this case, Japanese expatriates and local staff 
communicate in English in the office, and the local staff negotiates with local counterparts and 
performs the procedures in Russian. Some Japanese firms engaging in sales, etc., take measure (4) 
and utilize Russian distributors to develop local markets. In addition to utilizing local distributors, 
some collaborate with local companies, and others hire local staff with knowledge and experience 
in their relevant business field. However, it is difficult to capture highly professional and quality 
job seekers in Russia (Umetsu, 2017); thus, some Japanese firms in Russia offer high salaries to 
headhunt such human resources from other companies.32 
The facts mentioned above confirm that the entry of Japanese firms into the Russian 
market accelerated in 2005 but slumped in 2015 under the influence of economic sanctions after the 
2014 Crimean crisis and the depreciation of the ruble along with a collapse in oil prices. On the 
                                                        
32 One of the authors (Suganuma) heard in interviews in Russia that Japanese firms headhunt 
employees from other foreign rivals or Russian companies rather than Japanese competitors. 
Furthermore, a quantitative analytical study on human resource management measures in Russia 
confirmed that a high salary level can improve the motivation of Russian workers, and merit-based 
promotion can improve the motivation of Russian managers in particular (Fey et al. 2000). 
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other hand, it was found that Japanese firms already operating in Russia face various problems in a 
country with a markedly different historical background and culture, despite a geographical vicinity 
of two countries. Although concrete solutions to these problems seem to vary naturally for each 
individual company, the language is a common problem for Japanese firms doing business in 
Russia. To solve the language issue, Japanese firms in Russia take measures appropriate for their 
own situation. The former republics of the Soviet Union, which at one time formed a single country 
with Russia, each has its own language designated as the state language; after the systemic 
transformation, language issues seem to be more complicated than in Russia. In fact, the FSU 
countries, which are now independent states with sovereignty rights, may be seen, nonetheless, as a 
greater Russian-speaking sphere, where it is possible for many people to communicate with one 
another and make various documents and publications in Russian as well as in their new state 
languages. In the next section, therefore, we will consider the potential of the Russian-speaking 
sphere in the context of business and market. 
 
4. An essay on the Russosphere market 
4.1. Business and language: Russian as a business language 
Thus far, we have discussed the issue of specific features of the Russian market for Japanese 
investors and how they attempt to solve the various problems there. It seems that one major 
business obstacle to overcome is a language barrier in Russia, as was suggested in the previous 
section. While language issues have been relatively ignored in the literature of business and 
economics, foreign investors are often faced with challenges due to business culture differences as 
well as language differences (Welch et al. 2005). The following is an extreme case encountered by 
a Danish businessperson in his management operations in Latvia, one EEM still closely tied to the 
Russian-speaking community because of the solicitousness of the mass media and educational 
institutions to the situation of Russian speakers in the wake of Latvia’s postwar history as a part of 
the Soviet Union (Komori 2017).33 
 
“We were exposed to five languages every day.…The official language of the authorities was 
Latvian, and 273 of the work force and the local managing director spoke Russian only. English 
                                                        
33 The last national population census under the Soviet Union showed that 42.1% of Latvian 
residents spoke Russian as their first language and another 39.1% was fluent in Russian as a foreign 
language at the end of the 1980s (our calculations from the results of the USSR 1989 census, 
Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States 1993: 536–537). As of October 
2014, Russian was spoken by approximately 30% of the population, mainly Russian immigrants 
who live in the urban areas of the country (from the website of the BBC: Languages across Europe, 
Latvia, http://www.bbc.co.uk/languages/european_languages/countries/latvia.shtml). See also Table 
6 shown later. 
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was so to speak our working tool….With some of the older employees and with our German 
suppliers we communicated in German,…and amongst ourselves [the Danish expatriates], we 
obviously spoke Danish. The daily exposure to that many very different languages tends to keep 
one[’]s linguistic ability on its toes, but the constant need for translation is of course very time 
consuming.” (citation from Jacobsen and Meyer 1998: 11). 
 
Language challenges in the Russian cultural and/or historical sphere, or Russosphere,34 
can create such a demanding situation for Western investors that Russian language skills are widely 
seen as an essential qualification for expatriate managers based in Russia in order to communicate 
with a variety of stakeholders (Jacobsen and Meyer 1998). Our original questionnaire survey on the 
usage of Russian for Japanese businesspeople with experience in doing business in Russia and/or 
other FSU countries more or less supports the view that Russian language skills are an essential 
element for streamlining the business operations of Japanese firms in the Russosphere.35 This 
argument is supported by the fact that a working language between Japan’s business society and 
their counterparts from major CIS member states other than Russia is still the Russian language; 
according to the website of ROTOBO (2018), there were 64 various business networking events for 
encouraging commercial relations with these countries, in which it has been more or less involved 
from 2008 to date, where they talked through Japanese-Russian interpreters in 51 cases among 
those events with their working languages specified in the fliers or programs (54 cases in total).36 
Although business opportunities are still fairly limited there, with the exception of Russia, as is 
suggested in Table 5, we also found that the number of business entities and persons has been 
rising steadily in other CIS countries in recent years.37 Even now, the private sector is, in general, 
fragile there; thus, it seems difficult, if not impossible, for many Japanese investors to make purely 
private transactions without receiving public assistance (JETRO 2018). Nonetheless, local markets 
with much younger cohorts are expected to develop rapidly in the future and, unlike Russia, with 
which Japan has been involved in an intractable territorial dispute for more than half a century, no 
                                                        
34 A few other terms give expression to the community of Russian speakers such as Russophone 
(Ponarin 2000), Russophonia (Saunders 2014), and Russophonie (Usuyama 2014). In this paper, we 
use Russosphere, following the precedent set by Kotkin (2011), which describes a link that, as 
expressed by a shared language, history, and culture, is fundamental to contemporary world 
economic and political geography. 
35 Unless otherwise noted, the descriptions in this paragraph and the next two are based on 
information obtained from this survey, which is still being conducted when this paper was being 
written. We will report on the full results at another opportunity. 
36 English was used only in three events. We could not specify the working language(s) for the 
remaining nine cases. 
37 Because country-level investment data is not available for these countries, we substitute the 
Annual Report of Statistics on Japanese Nationals Overseas, published by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan, in which the number of long-term Japanese travellers as well as overseas 
companies has been reported since the 2006 edition. 
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country has political obstacles to boosting business operations at the private level. 
It should be noted here that Russian is seen as an indispensable language for 
documentation and technical/professional usage in the Russosphere market. The results of our 
questionnaire survey suggest that Russian should be widely used when drawing up formal contracts 
with external counterparts and making internal technical specifications, even in the Baltics and 
Central Asian countries where each local language is defined as a state language and is important 
for local Russian speakers to acquire. One respondent who was engaged in a natural gas 
development project in Turkmenistan, whose government has been most aggressive in limiting a 
usage of Russian for government office work and instruction at school (Fierman 2012), pointed out 
that their titular language, Turkmen, could not substitute for Russian for technical documentations 
inside the local gas industry. This view is endorsed by the description that the most prestigious 
higher education placements in Turkmenistan are in the Russian-medium branch of the 
Moscow-based Gubkin Petroleum and Gas University (Fierman 2012). According to an informant 
(a local resident, not a Japanese businessperson) in Lithuania, whereas Lithuanian and English are 
often employed when making contracts with EU partners, Lithuanian and Russian are necessary for 
doing business with Russian counterparts (from e-mail communication with the informant in 
Lithuania, December 21, 2017). Moreover, several questionnaire respondents emphasized that 
Russian language skills are necessary for communicating with on-site workers, local managers, and 
small and medium-sized enterprise counterparts in the area. Quite interestingly, one informant 
noted that both the acquisition of English and a revival of Russian can be observed for pragmatic 
reasons, even in Georgia, which has exchanged fire with Russia several times in territorial conflicts. 
In fact, several estimations reveal that Russian is now widely used as a language of commerce and 
communication in the post-Soviet linguistic space (see Table 6), in spite of the downsizing of the 
community of native Russian speakers due to the population exodus after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Saunders 2014; Usuyama 2014; Arefiev 2017: 115–150).  
Not only is every spoken/written language being employed for interpersonal and 
inter-unit communication in a company, but also a coded language for a specific use is an important 
element of business language, meaning that its misuse can create barriers and compound 
communications (Piekkari et al. 2014: 2–4). In fact, the intermingling of contract terms with an 
official orthographic system confused local landowners in Azerbaijan who were eligible for 
compensation for the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, in which two 
Japanese stakeholders (INPEX and Itochu Oil Exploration) have been deeply involved since the 
mid-2000s; it seemed hard for local people who were accustomed to Cyrillic letters to apprehend 
details of contracts written in Latin letters in accordance with the orthographic reform (started in 
1991 and completed in 2001) of Azerbaijan (Hirose 2006: 58). Another example would be official 
documentations required to be submitted to government authorities in Central Asia. Some Japanese 
19 
 
businesspeople report that their companies are more frequently asked to provide various documents 
in Russian rather than in each state language. This seems to be partly due to an immaturity of the 
new state languages for writing: our informants who are well-acquainted with the local situation in 
Uzbekistan testify about the efficacy of Russian as a business, official, and academic language, 
pointing out a writing deficiency in Uzbek38; a parallel situation can be observed in Kyrgyzstan, 
where more than 80% of publications to the general public and almost all academic articles were 
written in Russian at the end of the 2010s (Odagiri 2015: 86). In this country, one can see a large 
difference in achievement tests (the 2006 PISA) by OECD in terms of language groups; whereas 
students speaking Russian at home and attending schools where Russian was the language of 
instruction performed highest, students speaking Kyrgyz at home and attending schools where 
Kyrgyz was the language of instruction performed lowest (OECD 2010: 183–184). In the case of 
Kazakhstan, younger generations are expected to acquire an adequate command of Kazakh, 
Russian, and English to achieve social success in their lives (Minei and Kawanobe 2012: 142–143; 
see also Usuyama 2014). In sum, even a quarter century after independence from the Soviet Union, 
some FSU countries with minute Slavic minorities, mainly in Central Asia, where Russian enjoys a 
high level of prestige in elite domains (Fierman 2012), are not able to replace Russian with their 
own languages in the fields of business, education, and science inter alia. This understanding is 
supported by the fact that only a few respondents to our questionnaire survey felt it necessary to 
learn the local languages other than Russian to smooth their operations in the Central Asian region. 
An immature language for writing and academic use dates back to the pre-Russian Revolution 
period in Central Asia and the Caucasus, except for Armenia and Georgia39; this contributed to the 
rapid dominance of Russian during the Soviet era (Shiokawa 2004: 131–191). 
In fact, an example of a regionally integrated market with its common language as a hub 
of business operations is not unique in this area. Nearly a century after the end of Spain’s empire in 
Latin America, Spanish MNCs rushed into the region, and the country became the largest European 
investor in the mid-1990s (Financial Times, March 5, 1997). At that time, this phenomenon was 
reportedly explained by a common language and cultural ties with the majority of Latin American 
countries, with the exception of Brazil, a former Portuguese colony and non-Spanish area, and 
other small countries that designated English or French as their official languages. The linguistic, 
cultural, and economic bond between these two groups became the focus of attention again when, 
after two decades in which Spain amassed assets in Latin America, in the mid-2010s Latin 
                                                        
38 We heard this from different local people by e-mail communications in January 2018. For safety 
of the informants, we contacted them through a third party. According to Asamura (2008; 2015), the 
standard Uzbek language was born in 1934 after a decade long discussion and has thus far changed 
its letters several times: from Arabic to Latin character in 1929–30, from Latin to Cyrillic character 
in 1940–42, and, after the independence, from Cyrillic to Latin transcription again. 
39 These two languages have longer linguistic histories than Russian (Medvedev 2007). 
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American companies spent more to acquire their Spanish counterparts than the other way around 
(Economist, January 25, 2014). It is not difficult to imagine that the case grabbed the interest of 
economists, a number of whom found empirical evidence that cultural ties, including language, 
significantly affected the location decisions of Spanish firms abroad; these ties explained the 
leading position of Spanish MNCs in the Latin America region (Galan et al. 2007; Barrios and 
Benito 2010). 
The same discussion is also found in the literature of FDI in EEMs. To give a simpler 
example, FDI in Croatia in the 1990s might have been de facto war-related assistance from the 
Croatian community abroad, as Garibaldi et al. (2001) described when explaining why this country 
had received more significant direct investment than expected. An empirical analysis of the flow of 
FDI in country dyads provides significant evidence that politics, migration, and cultural relations 
between investors and hosts have strong positive effects on the flow of FDI (Bandelj 2002; 2008: 
65–130). This argument is partially sustained by another research survey (Deichmann 2004; 2010; 
2013 and Demekas et al. 2007), suggesting that these findings highlight the importance of 
examining how substantively different social relations—in other words linguistic, cultural, and 
historical proximities—among home and host investors shape the specific economic landscape in 
Europe. A meta-synthesis of 24 estimates of these proximities that were collected from the previous 
FDI studies in EEMs demonstrates that the synthesis figure of their partial correlation coefficients 
is 0.188 (random-effects model) with unweighted and weighted combination of the t values, 2.616 
and 2.050; the effect size is three times larger than that of the estimates of transition-related FDI 
determinants.40 An empirical study that examines the impact of FDI and socio-cultural similarities 
on Russia’s international trade also concludes that these two factors are significant in determining 
the trade volume between the country and its trade partners from developed economies (Iwasaki 
and Suganuma 2015). 
The literature of business and economics more widely supports the hypothesis that the 
ties of history and culture could explain a lot about who does business with whom (Economist, 
January 28, 2012). This point originated in early studies of international business, in which a 
special problem was posed by the existence of psychic distance and economic distance (transaction 
costs) and geographical distance incorporated into the gravity model (Beckerman 1956). Taking 
over the discussion, Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) found a negative relationship between 
the psychic distance and the overseas establishment of Swedish firms: sales agency relations were 
likely to be established in neighboring and culturally similar countries in the very early stage of 
internationalization, and, to a certain extent, the establishments of sales subsidiaries were expected 
to occur in the same order; the size of potential market, one of the most influential factors for 
                                                        
40 See Tokunaga and Iwasaki (2017) for the literature list, the methodology of meta-synthesis, and 
the results of meta-synthesis of other semantically clustered FDI determinants. 
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international operations, would become a driving force of internationalization in the later or more 
mature phase. More recent studies, which focus on language and the foreign expansion patterns of 
businesses, raise the prospect that the empire and the diaspora language paths could be traced when 
forming business networks of internationalizing companies (Piekkari et al. 2014: 14–19). With 
regard to international trade, Ghemawat (2010) calculated that two countries that have a 
colony/colonizer relationship trade with each other 188% more than would two otherwise identical 
countries that lack this historical bond; if a country dyad has a common land border, joins a 
regional trading block, and shares a common language, their trade volume similarly increases by 
125%, 47%, and 42%, respectively. An article published in the American Economic Review also 
draws conclusions that countries belonging to the same regional trade association trade more, as do 
countries sharing a language or land border, and a shared colonial history also encourages trade 
(Rose 2004). To estimate in a more rigorous way the language barriers to international trade, 
Lohmann (2011) set up the Language Barrier Index that is calculated using a linguistic dataset and 
showed that the effect of this index is about as negative and significant as that of the binary 
common language variable. Finally, a meta-analysis study about the language effect in international 
trade demonstrated that, on average, a common (official or spoken) language increases trade flow 
directly by 44%, with an increasing language effect on trade over time (Egger and Lassmann 2012). 
The history of the Soviet Union and developments after independence remind us that 
many factors cited above––Russian as an administrative and business language, the long history of 
the Russian and the Soviet Empire, the presence of a Russian diaspora as an institutionalized 
minority group, geographical proximity with a common land border, and the resurgence of a shared 
economic and educational landscape, to be described hereinafter––would be just as valid for the 
Russosphere region, European CIS member states and Central Asian countries, among others. 
Estimates of the total number of Russian speakers, including non-natives, range upward of 275 
million, thus ranking Russian as the fifth- or sixth-most-spoken language worldwide, following 
English, Chinese, Spanish, and Hindi or Arabic (Saunders 2014). Although the market size of the 
Russosphere takes up no more than 4–5% of the world’s total, it seems comparable with other 
linguistically based marketplaces, such as the Indosphere and the Hispanosphere, on the heels of 
the Anglosphere and the Sinosphere (see Table 7).41 This seemingly idle point has, nonetheless, 
been utilized by the Russian authority lately, and would provide an institutionally integrated 
economic and educational landscape for both inside and outside actors, which should have a 
non-negligible impact upon the world and Japanese investors too. We turn to this issue in the final 
section. 
 
                                                        
41  These are our calculations from World Economic Outlook Database provided by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF 2017), following the methodology of Kotkin (2011: 28–38). 
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4.2. Other clues: a re-emergent integrated economic and educational space 
Viewing the discussion above from the standpoint of macroeconomics, we would be able to find a 
sort of synchroneity or homogeneity across the post-Soviet Union marketplace, not least for outside 
observers. The literature of transition economies has focused attention on the economic linkages 
between Russia and other FSU countries. Some empirical studies, in which vector autoregression 
(VAR) models have been employed to assess the dynamics, reveal that: first, Russian economic or 
industrial growth was a significant determinant of economic performance in other CIS and Baltic 
countries in the period prior to the 1998 Russian financial crisis (Iwasaki 1999; Shiells et al. 2005); 
second, these significant cross-country spillovers from Russia diminished thereafter, and the growth 
links weakened significantly in the Baltics and probably Georgia largely because of their 
reorientation from Russia to the European Union as their main trade partner, especially in the 
context of the EU accession for the former and withdrawal from the CIS authority for the latter 
(Shiells et al. 2005; Obiora 2009); third, however, economic links between CIS countries and 
Russia still exist, mainly through financial and remittance channels, with a shrinking role for the 
trade channel (Alturki et al. 2009). As recent studies on the international labor movement in Central 
Asia and the Black Sea region suggest, economic immigrants from the countries neighboring 
Russia greatly impact individual livelihoods of immigrant workers as well as current accounts of 
their home countries through the flow of employee compensation and personal transfers, or 
remittances, to put it simply (Horie 2010; Ryazantsev et al. 2010; Kumo 2012; Uegaki 2017). 
Although further elaboration is needed, Figure 9 and Table 8 tell us that the GDP growth of FSU 
countries still seems to be closely linked with the dynamics of Russia’s economic growth rather 
than that of the EU, both in upward and downward phases.42 
Other indications would be the radical improvement in the business environment, on one 
hand, and the continuing high corruption rate, on the other, in CIS countries in the late years. With 
the exception of Kyrgyzstan, Russia and its neighboring countries have improved their rankings in 
the annual World Bank report titled Doing Business (see Table 9).43 The distance to a frontier 
country with the highest score has been substantially lessened in the last decade, and all countries, 
other than Kyrgyzstan, reached double-digit rates of positive changes. At the same time, the 
business environments of major EEMs, including the Baltics, that joined the EU more than a 
decade ago, have improved slightly relative to the CIS countries, partly because of the reasonably 
high scores of the former group. As long as these figures are available, there is almost no difference 
                                                        
42 The results of simple regression estimates of real GDP growth between Russia or the EU and 
other FSU countries were, in general, supported by a more sophisticated way of estimation (see 
Shiells et al. 2005). 
43 See Vedomosti, November 1, 2017, for an analysis of Russia’s latest Doing Business ranking 
(see also Table 3 for the trends of Russia’s ranking). 
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between three core members of the Eurasian Economic Union (Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan)44 
and the Visegrád Four group in Central Europe. However, in focusing on corruption, a crucial 
problem of emerging markets for foreign investors, one would see a totally different picture. One of 
the most cited indicators, the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International and 
results of another survey on bribery rates across Europe and Central Asia tell us that, even now, 
corruption levels are very high in post-Soviet Union countries, except for Georgia, as compared 
with the new EU member states, as Table 10 clearly demonstrates. The noticeable difference in the 
degree of corruption in these two country groups is statistically significant, and CIS member states 
record the highest deviation rate from the world trend of corruption levels among the transitional 
countries (Iwasaki and Suzuki 2012). 
Shedding light on the constraints impeding innovation in Russia from the viewpoint of 
market quality, which refers to market efficiency and fairness in pricing, resource distribution, and 
transaction, Mizobata (2017) argued that the country suffers from poor market quality: state 
intervention has continued, and, thus, competition is restricted in a monopolistic market; its formal 
rules and institutions are often violated or ignored, which results in a low level of enforcement and 
the high occurrence of corruption; state-owned companies have been main market players with a 
tendency toward rent-seeking rather than profit-seeking behavior. Many empirical studies on the 
Russian economy have reported institutional deficiency in line with this discussion (e.g., Kuznetsov 
and Kuznetsova 2003; Timofeyev 2011; Popov 2012). One would find these features in most but 
not all other CIS countries, especially in Moldova, Ukraine, and some Central Asian countries 
(Iwasaki and Suzuki 2007; Myant and Drahokoupil 2011: 132–136; Sakuwa 2015: 261–263; 
Djalilov 2016; Transparency International 2016; Adachi 2017), thus, explaining the similarly low 
levels of market quality and institutions. The last Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) V report also emphasizes that the size of informal payments made to 
public officials to “get things done” remained large in Russia and Central Asia, where just less than 
half of enterprises surveyed never made such payments; in several CIS countries, including Russia, 
more firms relied on such bribes than in the previous BEEPS IV survey (BEEPS 2015: 9). In 
relation to innovation, this report showed that corruption is an even greater constraint for 
innovative firms than non-innovative ones (BEEPS 2015: 10); this argument has been buttressed in 
a more rigorous way by empirical research using the BEEPS dataset (Ayyagari et al. 2014). 
 All things considered, one could say that a common economic landscape––but with low 
market quality and inferior institutions45––has been in place again, primarily in the CIS region, 
                                                        
44 In October 2007, these three countries established a Customs Union within the framework of the 
Eurasian Economic Community, which led to a creation of the Single Economic Space, and this has 
evolved into the current Eurasian Economic Union (Cooper 2013). 
45 The Eurasian Customs Union, for example, has contributed to the growth of illegal exports from 
outside the community, chiefly smuggling into Russia through other member states of the Eurasian 
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after the 2000s. The region witnessed a powerful initiative directed toward economic integration 
within the framework of CIS and others outside, such as the Eurasian Customs Union (the Eurasian 
Economic Community), the Single Economic Space, and the Eurasian Economic Union. In this 
project, there have been significant legal and institutional developments after repeated failures 
through the 1990s, especially in keeping the Russian ruble as a common currency (Tabata 2004). In 
spite of a few imperfections and uncertainties about the future, this ambitious project offers a 
future-oriented modernization agenda (e.g., WTO accession) and tangible economic benefits 
(Dragneva and Wolczuk 2013), and, thus, has attracted several post-Soviet Union countries, which 
seem to have difficulty prospering without the Russian economy. Here, we must keep in mind that 
the widely used administrative and business language is still Russian, not English; quite 
interestingly, the official languages of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a permanent 
intergovernmental international organization, with eight member states, are Russian and Chinese, 
even after India and Pakistan jointed in June 2017.46 Therefore, the Russian language can be said 
to be one of the important shared economic legacies, along with common physical infrastructure, 
such as energy pipelines, transport, and communications (Cooper 2013: 32). Parallel to this 
reintegration of common economic space, we now see an attempt to reconstruct a common 
educational space in the CIS region, with Russian as a strategic tool. Some studies have suggested 
that Russia should take the initiative to build a higher education system divergent from that of the 
western world within the framework of CIS international cultural and educational cooperation and 
other institutional efforts, leading to an increase in the number of foreign university students from 
neighboring countries in Russia in the 2000s and later (Sawano 2009; Minei and Kawanobe 2012: 
200–223; Arefiev 2017: 115–150; Matsumoto 2017). In June 2007, President Putin signed a decree 
establishing the Russkiy Mir Foundation, for the purpose of “promoting the Russian language, as 
Russia’s national heritage and a significant aspect of Russian and world culture, and supporting 
Russian language teaching programs abroad.”47 There is no doubt here about the superiority of 
Russian as a historically formed and developing communication language to be utilized 
strategically so as to rebuild a common educational space in the area. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Although the Russian market has been the largest investment destination among EEMs for world 
investors as well as Japanese firms, it seems that Russia is fairly different from the major Eastern 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Economic Union (Biernat 2018). 
46  Information from the website of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: About SCO, 
http://eng.sectsco.org/about_sco/. 
47 Citation from the website of the Russkiy Mir Foundation: About the Russkiy Mir Foundation, 
https://russkiymir.ru/en/fund/index.php. 
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European countries in that: first, it has great potential to provide business opportunities with a much 
higher investment return rate than in the European market where Japanese capital suppliers witness 
the lowest return rate in the world (Table 1). Second, these results can be understood by the fact 
that non-manufacturing sectors are the main targets of Japanese FDI in Russia, and their labor 
productivity or market profitability could be much higher if the oil-price-hike-lead growth model is 
available and results in the rapid expansion of consumption. Third, probably unlike the new EU 
members, Russia maintains their local language, even in business, despite the fact that it often 
becomes an investment barrier and increases transaction costs to outside counterparts in the 
non-Russian world. Together with the low market quality and inferior institutional settings, which 
would be recognized as business risks and uncertainties, this final point makes a number of 
potential smaller investors hesitate to enter the Russian market. 
 At the same time, because the Russian language is still a dominant business language in 
some FSU countries and the Russian diaspora who make an effort to maintain their identity both at 
the community level and on the global scene, a much wider business space and a more prospective 
marketplace closely tied by the de facto common language and a series of shared historic legacies 
would reappear in the sight of economic entities. Considering a burgeoning e-commerce sector in 
the internet age, new media is an additional factor for sustaining the Russian language in the 
business sphere, suggesting the emergence of uniquely Russian portion of virtual or cyber space 
(Saunders 2014; see also Gorham 2011 and Uffelmann 2011). In this paper, we dubbed this 
language-based business space after the Anglosphere and the like, and called it the Russosphere. 
The Russosphere is comparable to the Indosphere or the Hispanosphere in market size but seems to 
have a distinctive and unique market structure; however, very few researches thus far have 
examined this region from the viewpoint of business and language. Therefore, the need for further 
research that explores the performance implications of Russian as an important lingua franca in the 
business field is advocated. 
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Figure 1 Balance of Japanese FDI by region and internal reserves of Japanese firms 
(1996–2016) 
 
Note: End-of-year figures for FDI (JPYtn); End-of-the-financial-year figures for 
internal reserves (JPYtn); Finance and insurance sectors are not included in 
internal reserves because of the unavailability of data before the 2008 financial 
year. 
Sources: Compiled from Bank of Japan (various years) and Portal Site of Official 
Statistics of Japan (2016) 
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Figure 2 Japan’s foreign trade with emerging Europe (1996–2016) 
 
Note: Emerging Europe consists of the Central and Eastern European Countries, CIS 
countries, and Georgia. 
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Finance of Japan (2018) 
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Figure 3 Japan’s foreign investments to emerging Europe (1996–2016) 
 
Note: All figures are cited from the balance of payments of Japan. Emerging Europe 
consists of the Central and Eastern European Countries, CIS countries, and 
Georgia. 
Source: Compiled from Bank of Japan (2018a) 
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Figure 4 Balance of Japan’s cross-border lending to emerging Europe 
 (2004Q4–2017Q4) 
 
Note: Aggregate calculation by the Bank of Japan based on banking statistics released 
by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
Source: Compiled from Bank of Japan (2018b) 
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Table 1 Return rate of Japanese FDI by region 
1996–2016 Average Max. Min. Variance 
     
Asia 8.2% 11.7% -6.3% 0.0020 
North America 5.2% 7.3% 1.5% 0.0003 
Central and South 
America 
5.6% 11.0% -0.5% 0.0008 
Oceania 8.4% 20.4% 2.2% 0.0029 
Western Europe 3.8% 6.4% 1.2% 0.0003 
Emerging Europe 3.4% 10.7% -6.9% 0.0027 
  Russia 8.3% 62.7% -37.5% 0.0313 
  Other countries 3.5% 11.6% -7.9% 0.0034 
Middle East 32.3% 59.7% 11.0% 0.0187 
Africa 10.5% 29.5% -0.4% 0.0036 
1999–2007 Average Max. Min. Variance 
Asia 6.7% 11.4% -6.3% 0.0041  
North America 5.6% 7.3% 3.4% 0.0002  
Central and South 
America 
5.3% 9.4% -0.5% 0.0009  
Oceania 8.5% 20.4% 2.7% 0.0031  
Western Europe 3.3% 6.4% 1.2% 0.0003  
Emerging Europe 0.4% 9.9% -6.9% 0.0028  
  Russia 13.3% 62.7% -37.5% 0.0688  
  Other countries -0.2% 9.1% -7.9% 0.0034  
Middle East 40.2% 59.7% 25.1% 0.0158  
Africa 9.0% 15.0% -0.4% 0.0022  
1999–2013 Average Max. Min. Variance 
Asia 7.8% 11.7% -6.3% 0.0027  
North America 5.1% 7.3% 1.5% 0.0003  
Central and South 
America 
5.2% 9.4% -0.5% 0.0005  
Oceania 10.2% 20.4% 2.7% 0.0030  
Western Europe 3.6% 6.4% 1.2% 0.0003  
Emerging Europe 1.8% 9.9% -6.9% 0.0024  
  Russia 9.2% 62.7% -37.5% 0.0439  
  Other countries 1.3% 9.3% -7.9% 0.0027  
Middle East 32.7% 59.7% 11.0% 0.0225  
Africa 9.1% 15.0% -0.4% 0.0014  
Note: The return rate of direct income is obtained by dividing direct investment 
income by direct investment balance. 
Sources: Calculated based on data from the Bank of Japan (various years) and the 
Bank of Japan (2018a) 
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Figure 5 Labor productivity (sales per employee) of all Japanese firms in Europe 
(1995–2006) 
 
Source: Calculated using data from RIETI (2012)  
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Figure 6 Labor productivity (sales per employee) of Japanese manufacturers in Europe 
(1995–2006) 
 
Source: Calculated using data from RIETI (2012)  
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Figure 7 Labor productivity (sales per employee) of Japanese non-manufacturers in 
Europe (1995–2006) 
 
Source: Calculated using data from RIETI (2012)  
  
44 
 
Figure 8 Number of the entry and withdrawal of Japanese subsidiaries in Russia 
(2000–2016) 
 
Source: Compiled from Toyo Keizai (2009, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2017)  
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Table 2 Number of Japanese subsidiaries by industry type in Russia 
 (as of October 2016) 
Total number (192) 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishery 1 
 
Department store – 
Mining – 
 
Supermarket – 
Construction 1 
 
Specialty store 1 
Manufacturing (total) 46 
 
Automobile sales 2 
  Food 1 
 
Other retail – 
  Textiles and clothing – 
 
Food service – 
  Pulp and paper – 
 
Bank 5 
  Chemicals 1 
 
Trust bank – 
  Pharmaceuticals – 
 
Stockbroker – 
  Petroleum and coal – 
 
Investment trust and investment advisor – 
  Rubber 3 
 
Commodities futures – 
  Glass and ceramics 3 
 
Loans, sales on credit, and cards 1 
  Iron 1 
 
Lease 3 
  Non-ferrous metals – 
 
Capital investment – 
  Metals 1 
 
Other financier 2 
  Machinery 6 
 
Life insurance – 
  Electric equipment 6 
 
Property insurance 2 
  Transportation equipment 18 
 
Real estate 1 
  Precision equipment 3 
 
Hotel – 
  Other manufacturing 3 
 
Travel 2 
Electricity and gas – 
 
Leisure and amusement – 
Train and bus – 
 
Consulting – 
Cargo transportation 2 
 
Architectural design – 
Shipping – 
 
Worker dispatching and business 
contracting 
1 
Aviation – 
 
Building management and security – 
Warehouse and logistics 10 
 
Machine repair – 
Communication and broadcast 1 
 
Other services 3 
Press and publishing – 
 
Managing company 1 
Video and music – 
   
Advertising 3 
   
Information systems and software 4 
   
General wholesale 3 
   
Wholesale (textile and clothing)  – 
   
Wholesale (food) 3 
   
Wholesale (chemicals) 6 
   
Wholesale (pharmaceuticals) 2 
   
Wholesale (petroleum and fuel)  – 
   
Wholesale (glass and ceramics) – 
   
Wholesale (iron and metals) 3 
   
Wholesale (machinery) 18 
   
Wholesale (electric equipment) 21 
   
Wholesale (transportation equipment) 18 
   
Wholesale (precision equipment) 12 
   
Other wholesale 14       
Note: The establishment and investment of multiple subsidiaries by one company 
are included in the table. 
Source: Compiled from Toyo Keizai (2017) 
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Table 3 Russia’s business environment rankings (2010–2017) 
No. Items 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
1    Ease of doing business (rank) 123/183 120/183 112/185 92/189 62/189 51/189 40/190 35/190 
2    Starting a business (rank) 108 111 101 88 34 41 26 28 
3    Dealing with construction permits (rank) 182 178 178 178 156 119 115 115 
4    Getting electricity (rank) – 183 184 117 143 29 30 10 
5    Registering property (rank) 51 45 46 17 12 8 9 12 
6    Getting credit (rank) 89 98 104 109 61 42 44 29 
7    Protecting minority investors (rank) 93 111 117 115 100 66 53 51 
8    Paying taxes (rank) 105 105 64 56 49 47 45 52 
9    Trading across borders (rank) 162 160 162 157 155 5 140 100 
10    Enforcing contracts (rank) 18 13 11 10 14 170 12 18 
11    Resolving insolvency (rank) 103 60 53 55 65 51 51 54 
12    Corruption Perceptions Index (rank) 154/178 143/183 133/176 127/177 136/175 119/168 131/176 135/180 
Note: The higher a country is ranked, the better its business environment. The numbers on the right of the slash character in Nos. 1 and 
12 indicate the total numbers of countries. For Nos. 2–11, the total number of countries is the same as that of No. 1. When there 
are no data, it is indicated as “－.” 
Sources: Compiled using data from the World Bank (2006, 2011, 2016, 2018) for Nos. 1–21 and Transparency International (various 
years) for No. 22 
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Table 4 Overview of the interview survey in Russia (2015–2017)1) 
No. 
of 
firms 
Industrial 
classification 
of the parent 
company 
Type of 
operation2) 
Legal status 
(form of base) 
Position of 
interviewee 
Policies and actions to do business in Russia 
1 Service 
Sales (for 
Japanese 
companies) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
At the time of start-up, a Japanese who lived in Russia and 
was familiar with the local situation was asked to help the 
business. Most local employees are Japanese-speaking 
Russians. A Russian who lived in Japan for a long time is 
mainly involved in negotiations with local counterparts. 
2 Service 
Collection and 
provision of 
information 
(mainly for 
Japan but also 
for Russia) 
Representative 
office 
Top 
management 
Japanese-speaking Russians are hired. 
3 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
Constant negotiations with the competent authorities and local 
governments concerned 
4 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Representative 
office and 
subsidiary 
Departmental 
head 
Promotion of localization. A Russian businessperson with 
extensive domestic business experience is assigned to the 
President of the company and Director of Sales (A Japanese 
expatriate was assigned to the financial department 
previously). Most products are sold through the sales network 
of the company. 
5 Service 
Collection and 
provision of 
information (for 
Japan and 
Russia) 
Representative 
office 
Top 
management 
Active development of new business fields or sales areas 
6 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Representative 
office and 
subsidiary 
Top 
management 
The top management is a Russian-speaking Japanese with 
business experience in Russia. The sales manager is 
headhunted from another company in the same industry. Local 
Russian partners are used. 
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7 Service 
Collection and 
provision of 
information (for 
Japanese 
companies) 
Representative 
office 
Top 
management 
A business tie-in with an influential Russian company in the 
same industry 
8 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Representative 
office 
Top 
management 
The top management is a Russian-speaking Japanese with 
business experience in Russia. Dealer networks are used for 
sales. Promotion of localization through joint production with 
a Russian counterpart. 
9 Manufacturing 
R&D (for the 
parent company) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
Promotion of localization. A Russian businessperson is 
assigned as top management. Joint venture with a Russian 
company. 
10 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
There is no inextricable particular problem of business in 
Russia except for macro-economic situations such as the 
fluctuation of the exchange rate. Particular countermeasures 
are not taken. 
11 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
Russian distributors and exhibitioners are used. 
12 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Representative 
office and 
subsidiary 
Advisor 
Promotion of localization. A Russian businessperson is 
assigned as top management. Russian distributors are used. A 
Russian-speaking Japanese is employed for the starting of the 
business. 
13 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
Russian distributors are used. 
14 Manufacturing 
Manufacturing 
(for Russia) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
Good relationship with local government. Conclusion of 
dealer agreements with workers and flexible recruiting of new 
graduates for securing employment. 
15 Manufacturing 
Manufacturing 
(for Japanese 
companies) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
Provision of information from local government. Joint venture 
with Japanese companies. Russian collaborators exist. A 
Russian-speaking Japanese with experience residing and 
doing business in Russia is employed. 
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16 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
From 
representative 
office to 
subsidiary 
Top 
management 
Russian distributors are used. Japanese-speaking Russians are 
used for sales. 
17 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Representative 
office 
Top 
management 
Large retail stores are used. Local employees who are familiar 
with the operation are hired. 
18 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Subsidiary 
Departmental 
head 
Russian distributors are used. A Russian-speaking Japanese is 
hired. Top management is from a third country. Japanese 
expatriates are employed in the company’s major departments.  
19 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
Local retail stores and distributors are used. 
20 Service 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
Those who have business experience are headhunted from 
another company in the same industry. 
21 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
Local retail stores and distributors are used. Locally employed 
Russian-speaking Japanese and Japanese-speaking Russians 
are hired. 
22 Service 
Collection and 
provision of 
information (for 
Japan) 
Representative 
office 
Top 
management 
A Russian-speaking Japanese with experience residing and 
doing business in Russia is employed. 
23 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Representative 
office 
Top 
management 
The President is a Russian-speaking Japanese with experience 
residing and doing business in Russia. Locally employed 
Russian-speaking Japanese with business experience are hired. 
Cooperation with a local partner company and constant 
negotiation with governments and customers (Russian 
companies) concerned. 
24 Service 
Collection and 
provision of 
information (for 
Japan) 
Representative 
office 
Top 
management 
Business tie-in with a Russian partner company 
25 Manufacturing 
Sales (for Russia 
and Japan) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
A Russian collaborator exists. Business tie-in with a Japanese 
company. Top management is a Japanese with long business 
experience in Russia. Japanese management systems are 
applied to production sites. 
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26 Service 
Sales (for Russia 
and Japan) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
Russian partner companies are used. 
27 Service 
Sales (for 
Japanese 
companies) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
Business tie-in with a Russian partner company whose parent 
company is a foreign-owned company 
28 Manufacturing 
Sales (for 
Russia) 
Subsidiary 
Departmental 
head 
A Russian-speaking Japanese who is familiar with local 
situations is assigned as top management. Russian distributors 
are used. 
29 Service 
Collection and 
provision of 
information (for 
Japanese 
companies) 
Representative 
office 
Top 
management 
Cooperation with a Russian partner company whose parent 
company is a foreign-owned company 
30 Manufacturing 
Manufacturing 
(for Russia) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
Promotion of localization. Russian-speaking Japanese 
employees who are familiar with business in Russia are 
assigned to negotiate with Russian counterparts (local 
governments, etc.). The President has extensive business 
experience in this field in Russia. The President of the 
headquarters in Japan is also actively building personal 
connections with local governments. For technical issues, an 
expert is dispatched from Japan when it is necessary. There is 
active support from local governments. 
31 Manufacturing 
Manufacturing 
(for Russia) 
Subsidiary 
Top 
management 
A Russian staff that is familiar with local circumstances is 
employed to consult and negotiate with Russian counterparts 
(local governments, etc.). The President of the local subsidiary 
is Japanese with business experience in Russia as an 
expatriate. There are also Japanese managers for each 
department. There is active support from local governments. 
Note: 1) The information in the table is based on statements at the time of interviews; 2) In terms of business development, “for 
Japanese companies,” “for Russia,” and “for Japan” denote the Japanese companies operating in Russia, the Russian market, and 
the Japanese market, respectively. 
Source: Compiled with information from our interview survey in Russia 
51 
 
Table 5 Number of Japanese long-term businesspeople and overseas companies in 2005, 2010, and 2015 
 2005 2010 2015 
Country group 
Representa- 
tive office 
Branch 
office 
Overseas 
subsidiary 
Business-
person 
Representa- 
tive office 
Branch 
office 
Overseas 
subsidiary 
Business-
person 
Representa- 
tive office 
Branch 
office 
Overseas 
subsidiary 
Business-
person 
Russia 144 7 145 680 157 5 265 678 165 11 248 946 
European CIS 11 0 11 15 14 0 19 38 17 2 27 21 
Central Asia 30 4 7 68 38 3 17 87 41 3 32 84 
Caucasus 6 0 1 7 7 0 1 12 9 2 6 17 
Baltics 0 0 10 6 0 0 24 10 1 0 52 16 
Total 191 11 174 776 216 8 326 825 233 18 365 1084 
Note: European CIS consist of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. 
Source: Compiled using data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2006, 2011, 2016) 
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Table 6 State language, official language, and Russian in FSU countries (as of the early 2010s) 
Country State language 1) Official language 1) 
Russian as principal 
language 2) 
Percentage of native Russian 
speakers 3) 
Percentage of 
fluent Russian 
speakers 3) 
Percentage of 
respondents to a 
questionnaire 
survey 4) 
Group A Group B Estimation A Estimation B Estimation B TV Press 
Armenia Armenian    Negligible 0.3% 58.6% 87% 48% 
Azerbaijan Azerbaijani   ✓ 1.4% 1.6% 54.9% 56% 24% 
Belarus 
Belarusian and 
Russian 
 
✓ ✓ 70.2% 94.6% 97.9% 96% 81% 
Georgia Georgian   ✓ 1.2% 2.3% 57.5% 43% 16% 
Kazakhstan Kazakh Russian ✓ ✓ Non-available 15.6% 84.4% 90% 66% 
Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyz Russian ✓ ✓ 9.0% 7.2% 48.6% 78% 49% 
Moldova Moldovan  ✓ ✓ 9.7% 13.7% 54.9% 86% 61% 
Russia Russian  ✓ ✓ 85.7% 83.8% 96.2% － － 
Tajikistan Tajik  ✓ ✓ Non-available 0.7% 33.0% 91% 70% 
Ukraine Ukrainian  ✓  29.6% 26.3% 80.7% 84% 51% 
Uzbekistan Uzbek  ✓ ✓ 14.2% 3.1% 41.3% － － 
Turkmenistan Turkmen  ✓  12.0% 2.9% 17.6% － － 
Estonia Estonian   ✓ 29.6% 29.9% 70.9% 49% 24% 
Latvia Latvian   ✓ 33.8% 32.9% 87.0% 76% 31% 
Lithuania Lithuanian    8.0% 5.9% 42.6% 52% 13% 
Note: 1) Regional or quasi state and/or official languages are excluded. 2) Russian as principal language is based on information from 
the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Group A) and the Ethnologue (Group B). 3) Percentages of native 
Russian speakers and fluent Russian speakers are citations from the CIA World Factbook (Estimation A) and our calculations 
from Arefiev’s monograph (Estimation B). 4) The share of respondents in each country claiming to watch Russian-language 
television or read Russian-language newspapers or journals “regularly or fairly regularly” are citations from the Eurasian Monitor 
opinion survey (Demoskop Weekly 2008). 
Sources: Compiled from Demoskop Weekly (2008), Arefiev’s monograph (2017: 121–122), the CIA (2018), the Ethnologue (2018), and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2018) 
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Table 7 Share of World GDP (PPP) (2000–2017) 
Marketplace 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Anglosphere 27.1% 26.8% 26.6% 26.3% 25.9% 25.5% 24.9% 24.1% 23.4% 22.8% 
Sinosphere 8.7% 9.2% 9.7% 10.1% 10.6% 11.1% 11.8% 12.7% 13.4% 14.6% 
Indosphere 4.2% 4.3% 4.3% 4.5% 4.6% 4.8% 5.0% 5.2% 5.2% 5.7% 
Hispanosphere 8.7% 8.5% 8.1% 7.9% 7.8% 7.7% 7.7% 7.7% 7.9% 5.3% 
Russosphere (A) 4.2% 4.3% 4.4% 4.6% 4.7% 4.8% 4.9% 5.1% 5.2% 4.8% 
Russosphere (B) 3.9% 4.1% 4.1% 4.3% 4.4% 4.5% 4.6% 4.8% 4.9% 4.6% 
Marketplace 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017   
Anglosphere 22.2% 21.7% 21.5% 21.2% 21.0% 20.9% 20.6% 20.4%   
Sinosphere 15.3% 16.1% 16.7% 17.4% 18.0% 18.5% 19.1% 19.6%   
Indosphere 6.0% 6.1% 6.2% 6.4% 6.7% 7.0% 7.2% 7.5%   
Hispanosphere 5.3% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.3% 5.2% 5.1% 5.0%   
Russosphere (A) 4.8% 4.9% 4.9% 4.8% 4.7% 4.4% 4.3% 4.3%   
Russosphere (B) 4.6% 4.7% 4.7% 4.6% 4.6% 4.3% 4.2% 4.1%   
Note: Anglosphere: U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, Ireland, and New Zealand; Sinosphere: China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau; 
Indosphere: India; Hispanosphere: Spain and Latin American countries with Spanish as an official language; Russosphere (A): 
FSU countries with Russian as the principal language (Group A in Table 6); Russosphere (B): FSU countries with Russian as the 
principal language (Group B in Table 6) 
Sources: Calculated using data from the IMF (2017) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2018) 
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Figure 9 Annual real GDP growth rate (1993–2017) 
 
Note: European CIS consists of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. All figures are based on weighted averages within each country group. 
Source: Compiled from IMF (2017) 
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Table 8 Simple correlation coefficients of the annual real GDP growth rate 
between Russia/the EU and other FSU countries (1993–2017) 
 1993–2017 1993–1998 1999–2008 2009–2017 
Country group Russia 
European CIS 0.92 0.81 0.27 0.94 
Central Asia 0.88 0.86 0.10 0.84 
Caucasus 0.73 0.78 0.27 -0.01 
Baltics 0.62 0.65 0.40 0.82 
Country group EU 
European CIS 0.32 0.26 0.12 0.59 
Central Asia 0.10 0.25 0.17 0.29 
Caucasus 0.27 0.68 0.28 -0.44 
Baltics 0.74 0.77 0.36 0.83 
Note: European CIS consist of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. All figures are based on 
weighted averages within each country group. 
Source: Estimated using data from the IMF (2017) 
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Table 9 Ease of Doing Business scores (2010–2018) 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Change 
of score 
Percentage 
of change 
Armenia 61.0  61.6  64.2  68.1  67.9  69.9  70.4  71.9  72.5  +11.5  18.8%  
Azerbaijan 61.8  62.6  63.0  63.7  62.2  66.0  66.8  67.1  70.2  +8.4  13.6%  
Belarus 51.9  54.1  59.0  62.5  67.2  71.6  71.1  74.5  75.1  +23.2  44.7%  
Georgia 73.8  76.2  78.9  81.8  80.7  76.8  77.4  79.9  82.0  +8.3  11.2%  
Kazakhstan 56.1  58.5  61.4  61.5  61.1  68.0  70.0  74.4  75.4  +19.3  34.4%  
Kyrgyzstan 60.9  62.9  61.5  63.3  61.9  65.1  65.1  65.2  65.7  +4.8  7.9%  
Moldova 58.0  58.6  59.7  60.7  62.9  71.1  71.7  72.8  73.0  +15.0  25.8%  
Russia 54.6  54.0  56.4  58.5  67.8  71.6  73.7  74.7  75.5  +20.9  38.2%  
Tajikistan 41.6  44.2  44.4  45.8  44.3  51.8  54.6  55.9  56.9  +15.3  36.8%  
Ukraine 39.6  44.1  44.3  48.8  59.9  61.7  62.9  63.9  65.8  +26.1  66.0%  
Uzbekistan 38.7  39.8  42.9  45.8  48.0  57.9  61.5  61.9  66.3  +27.6  71.2%  
Estonia 76.0  76.3  76.0  75.6  78.0  80.0  80.6  80.8  80.8  +4.8  6.4%  
Latvia 72.9  73.4  76.5  76.6  77.4  77.7  78.6  80.1  79.3  +6.3  8.7%  
Lithuania 73.3  73.3  73.9  73.9  74.8  77.6  78.6  78.8  79.9  +6.6  9.0%  
Czech Republic 63.2  67.9  68.6  70.0  72.2  75.5  76.0  76.2  76.3  +13.1  20.8%  
Hungary 65.3  67.1  66.9  66.9  66.9  72.2  71.8  72.1  72.4  +7.1  10.8%  
Poland 62.8  64.8  65.6  71.6  73.0  75.4  76.4  77.1  77.3  +14.5  23.0%  
Slovak Republic 68.5  69.8  69.8  70.8  71.4  73.5  75.0  75.2  74.9  +6.4  9.3%  
Romania 63.4  62.6  62.5  63.9  66.4  72.9  72.5  72.7  72.9  +9.5  14.9%  
Note: A higher score means a better business environment. 
Source: Compiled using data from the World Bank (various years) 
  
57 
 
Table 10 Corruption Perceptions Index (2012–2017) and Bribery Rates (2016) 
Corruption Perceptions Index 1) 
Bribery 
Rates 2) 
Country 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2016 
Armenia 34  36  37  35  33  35  24% 
Azerbaijan 27  28  29  29  30  31  38% 
Belarus 31  29  31  32  40  44  20% 
Georgia 52  49  52  52  57  56  7% 
Kazakhstan 28  26  29  28  29  31  29% 
Kyrgyzstan 24  24  27  28  28  29  38% 
Moldova 36  35  35  33  30  31  42% 
Russia 28  28  27  29  29  29  34% 
Tajikistan 22  22  23  26  25  21  50% 
Ukraine 26  25  26  27  29  30  38% 
Uzbekistan 17  17  18  19  21  22  18% 
Turkmenistan 17  17  17  18  22  19  – 
Estonia 64  68  69  70  70  71  5% 
Latvia 49  53  55  56  57  58  15% 
Lithuania 54  57  58  59  59  59  24% 
Czech 
Republic 
49  48  51  56  55  57  9% 
Hungary 55  54  54  51  48  45  22% 
Poland 58  60  61  63  62  60  7% 
Slovak 
Republic 
46  47  50  51  51  50  12% 
Romania 44  43  43  46  48  48  29% 
Note: 1) A higher score means a lower corruption level for the Corruption Perceptions 
Index. 2) Bribery Rates denote the percentage of households that paid a bribe 
when accessing basic services. 
Source: Compiled using data from Transparency International (various years) and 
Transparency International (2016: 17–18) 
 
